Det skottske prosjektet tror jeg gjorde en stor feil når de brukte blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag.
Og det bør tettes mellom A- Bølger og B- turbin. - Her kan man bruke Belg prinsippet. (trekkspill). Da er det kun luften og trykket som møter turbinbladene. - Ikke saltvann og den korridering å alger det medfører.
Med forbehold om at jeg nå er langt utenfor mitt yrkesmessige fagfelt:
Denne løsningen virker som i hovedsak å behandle tidevannet som en (lavfrekvent) bølge, ikke som en strøm av skiftende styrke. Jeg utelukker ikke at det kan være en gyldig betrakningsvinkel (om enn med en viss skepsis).
Likevel: Å gå fra tidevann som strøm, til tidevann som bølge (med periode rundt tolv timer) til en luftstrøm, som driver en luft-turbin .... Jeg vil naturligvis ikke utelukke det som et mulig alternativ. Men ....
Det er vanskelig å forestille seg at det er mulig realisere en slik løsning til en kostnad som konkurrere med en "enkel" turbinløsning som direkte utnytter vannstrømmen i et lokalt sund til å produsere hundre kilowatt eller noe deromkring. Min magefølelse sier at denne luft-turbin-løsningen krever dramatisk større investeringer. Følgelig må den produsere dramatiske mengder energi, og er lite egnet for lokal småskala energiproduksjon i småsamfunn langs kysten.
Det skottske prosjektet tror jeg gjorde en stor feil når de brukte blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag.
"Det skottske prosjektet" får det til å virke som at det var ett eneste. Det var diverse havkraft-prosjketer i Skottland.
Det andre er din avvising av "blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag". Det synes som en forutinntatt forestilling, trolig basert på en forståelse av hvordan en skipspropell fungerer i forhold til et skrog. En vannturbin som står fritt, uavhengig av noe skrog, er fullstendig symmetrisk med hensyn på vannstrømmen. Det er ingen grunn til å utforme bladene slik at de gir større effekt/virkningsgrad om vannet flyter den ene veien framfor den andre.
Jeg skal ikke utelukke at du selv i en 100% symmetrisk situasjon kan ha større gevinst av å optimalisere for flyt i den ene retningen enn det vil gi deg tap i den motsatte retingen - selv om det for meg som ikke-faglært synes underlig og overraskende. Hvis det er mulig å gi noen "folkelig", eller "intiuitiv" forklaring på noe slikt, er jeg Luthers øre!
Har du satt blåser i båt før på sjø?. Da vet du at når det er stille er det ikke stille. Alltid opp og ned på sjøen.
De hadde et prosjekt i skottland mao det er prøvd, men turbin blir montert for langt nede ved vannet som jeg skriver at det må skjermes mot saltet. - Min mening.
Det skottske prosjektet tror jeg gjorde en stor feil når de brukte blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag.
"Det skottske prosjektet" får det til å virke som at det var ett eneste. Det var diverse havkraft-prosjketer i Skottland.
Det andre er din avvising av "blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag". Det synes som en forutinntatt forestilling, trolig basert på en forståelse av hvordan en skipspropell fungerer i forhold til et skrog. En vannturbin som står fritt, uavhengig av noe skrog, er fullstendig symmetrisk med hensyn på vannstrømmen. Det er ingen grunn til å utforme bladene slik at de gir større effekt/virkningsgrad om vannet flyter den ene veien framfor den andre.
Jeg skal ikke utelukke at du selv i en 100% symmetrisk situasjon kan ha større gevinst av å optimalisere for flyt i den ene retningen enn det vil gi deg tap i den motsatte retingen - selv om det for meg som ikke-faglært synes underlig og overraskende. Hvis det er mulig å gi noen "folkelig", eller "intiuitiv" forklaring på noe slikt, er jeg Luthers øre!
The performance of the counter rotating Wells turbine has been found to be lower than expected. This is due to the random oscillatory nature of the flow through the turbine when driven by waves. The random oscillating flow causes an earlier onset of stall in the turbine than when the flow is steady and unidirectional, with the occurrence of stall reducing the turbine efficiency. Such a dramatic difference between the unidirectional and oscillating flow performances of Wells turbines had not been previously observed. The lack of suitable oscillating flow facilities for testing the turbine meant that this effect could not have been predicted. In addition, the increased amount of turbine stall meant that a more substantial silencer was required. A noise attenuation chamber was retrofitted onto the end of the turbine ducting to solve this. Although no significant pressure drop occurs across this chamber, studies of the flow distribution around the annulus of the turbine ducting indicate that the chamber causes a mal-distribution of flow during the intake stroke of the turbine. The increased airflow at the bottom of the turbine ducting causes a further increase in stall with an associated reduction in turbine performance.
Rapporten virker relativt forståelig selv for oss som ikke hører til fagfeltet, og jeg skal lese den grundig. Umiddelbart ser jeg at det her er snakk om vindturbiner, ikke vannturbiner, og jeg vet ikke hvor drirekte man kan trekke konklusjoner fra luft til vann.
Fra Wikipedia ser jeg at en Wells-turbin er designet til å spinne i samme rotatasjonsretning uansett om luftstrømmen går den ene eller den andre veien. Artikkelen påpeker også problemet med steiling in denne typen turbiner. Steiling er vel et generelt problem, men når det spesielt er nevnt for Wells-turbiner, antar jeg at det er mer vesentlig der enn for andre turbin-typer.
Dette anlegget er et bølge-kraftverk, der retningen snur svært ofte (typisk i området rundt ti sekunder per syklus), men med betydelig skiftende periode. Det er ikke noe tidevanns-kraftverk med en syklus på rundt tolv timer, helt stabilt og uforanderlig. Det kan ha svært stor betydning for effektiviteten til, og evnentuelle problemer med, en gitt turbin-type.
Jeg observerer at det for en spesifikk type vindturbin viste seg å være større problemer med steiling enn forventet. Kanskje ikke enveis vindturbiner av Wells-type er den ideelle løsningen. Det er ingen solid grunn til å avvise hydroturbiner av helt andre typer, turbiner som er like effektive om vannet flyter den ene eller den andre veien, men snur rotasjonsretning med vannstrømmen, og som opererer i en vannstrøm med en syklustid på tolv timer eller derover.
blir vel Europeisk pris på strømmn i Norge også med slike problemer. Kanskje vi skal starte Store Norske Kullkompani og sende «Røde Robert» nordover igjen?
Anbefaler prepping enda mer. Dette er vanlig nede i Europa nå, på tysk, jeg har fått meg ny PC og der er der oversettningsprogram som er veldig grei å ha. Skal begynne med prepping i dag, for nå skriver de der nede Economy Because of the German energy transition: Blackout risk is increasing throughout Europe Twice this year we already scratched past a blackout with a hair-sharp. Experts now consider a transnational power outage to be the most likely disaster - and the most dangerous. This is due, among other things, to the German energy transition.
Twice this year, the time had almost come. On the 8th January 2021 at 1.04 p.m., a sharp frequency drop occurred in the Austrian electricity grid as a result of a power plant failure in Romania. The Association of European Transmission System Operators proclaimed the third of four warning levels. Because if the fluctuations are too high, machines switch off from self-protection. If this also happens with power plants, the failure of a single power plant triggers a chain reaction - and it gets dark throughout Europe. But that didn't happen after all. Interference in the power grid tenfold Once again, a blackout almost occurred in early summer - but only almost. The disruptions in the European electricity grid have indeed increased tens of times, but they have not led to noticeable blackouts - so far. One reason for the unstable state of the electricity grid is Germany's energy transition: The continued shutdown of the power plants increases the risk of blackout. https://exxpress.at/media/2021/09/abd0016.jpgCandles would have to replace the electric light in case of a blackoutAPA Without electricity, everything collapses: the supply of food, the health system, telecommunications, transport infrastructure. All life in a modern civilization, whether public or private, depends on electrical energy. Without electricity - no light, no toilets, no heating, no telephone, no trains and trams, no supermarket checkout, no elevators. Water supply, television, mobile networks, Internet and traffic lights say goodbye, electric doors remain closed, lifts get stuck. After 24 hours, the traffic routes are clogged because more and more cars are running out of gas. After 48 hours, candles and gas stoves can cause large fires. Wastewater floods the roads, epidemics spread. After 72 hours, the right of thumb applies In several countries, the drinking water supply would collapse. However, in Austria, the drinking water supply for most people should still be ensured for a certain period of time. At least that's what the Austrian Association for the Gas and Water Industry (ÖVGW) says. The waterworks are equipped to be able to supply the daily need for drinking water for cooking and drinking and hygiene even in an emergency. Large parts of the country and thus a large part of the population get drinking water from the tap even in the event of a blackout, explains Wolfgang Nöstlinger, Vice-President of the ÖVGW. https://exxpress.at/media/2021/09/windmills-ga1c10e9e1-1920.jpg2021 went particularly badly for alternative energies, partly because of the low wind However, the supply of diesel fuel for the emergency generator sets would also be problematic. In any case, a nationwide supply of vital goods and services to citizens would no longer be possible after a few days. The state is unlikely to be able to ensure the safety of citizens after 72 hours at the latest. Public order would collapse and the only right of thumb applies anymore. Conditions such as in the early Middle Ages would be conceivable. The damage would also be enormous, far higher than in the event of a new pandemic or floods. Green electricity reduces stability In order to compensate for fluctuations and prevent a blackout, 43 companies from 36 countries have joined forces. This international system is intended to stabilize the power supply. But the rules of the game changed with renewable energies. Now electricity comes from many sources, from the solar system on the roof to the wind turbine in the field. Power plants are no longer being built where people consume a lot of electricity. Incidentally, an industrialized country like Germany cannot currently be maintained by alternative energy sources. In addition, the year 2021 was particularly bad for renewable energies. It could be the weakest year since 2003. Coal is therefore the most important energy source in Germany. What makes the supply even more difficult: It can only be achieved over long transport routes. It is therefore feared that the European electricity grid will lose stability with the further expansion of green electricity, also because of the large number of energy sources. In addition, the network offers a larger attack surface due to increasing digitization and energy transition - see cyberatacke, as experienced by Ukraine in 2015 and 2016. Hackers had sneaked into the networks of three energy suppliers and hijacked the control electronics. Then they switched off the power supply for large parts of Kiev. You can see: A blackout is not an unrealistic dystopia. For most experts, it is no longer the question of whether it occurs, but whenhttps://exxpress.at/blackout-gefahr-in-ganz-europa-steigt-wegen-deutsche-energiewende/?fbclid=IwAR2ckHZrSjq4LET7yv1zoiX62UvOzqhY9Kp377eVbv0HATAHkSVZr2ffeFM
Her sier de direkte at det er tyskernes overgang til sol vind og vedfyring (heter biomasse, trepellets) som har skylden.
Dettte er nok enda en smule mer nifst, mange ser nok på det som overdreven, men, når forsvarsdepartemenete og HÆREN i Østerrike begynner å skrive slik bør en kanskje vurdere å tro på det. SIGNS OF EUROPE-WIDE COLLAPSE ARE CONDENSING
Federal army warns of blackout!
[right]Imago Images[/right]
The blackout warnings are increasing. New reports come almost every day. After the great warning from the Minister of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense is now also daring to get out of cover. The federal army on Facebook openly warns against a Europe-wide blackout. The signs that a complete Europe-wide collapse is imminent are condensing, as the blackout expert Herbert Saurugg explained in an interview.
After the Ministry of the Interior, now also the Ministry of Defense
Federal army warns of blackout in a short film
Communication and cooperation between state institutions must be provided
The police are supported to protect critical infrastructure
Self-provision necessary for at least 14 days
In this short film, the haunt is already over after three days.Herbert Saurugg explained in an interview that you should also be prepared for a longer blackout of at least one week. Herbert Saurugg also has an excellent report on the side of the Austrian Federal Army, "Blackout - Nothing works anymore".Self-provision for a period of at least 14 days is enormously important.
Realistic danger According to the Federal Army, a large-ranging power, infrastructure and supply failure is a realistic but underestimated danger. This short film describes a three-day scenario. Benefits of the Federal Army and care of a family in these three days, mentioning the self-sufficiency of durable food for 14 days. Preparations for such a scenario were started by the federal army in time. Among other things, this is about maintaining communication. This is a central point. The communication lines would also work without electricity.Through cooperation with the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of the Interior and other state authorities, Austria's leadership ability is guaranteed. How long do the units last and how many are there? The supply of water and fuel is immediately without electricity. The federal army is equipped with generator sets. It is worrying that more than 80 percent of the emergency generator sets were canceled within twelve hours during a federal army exercise in 2020. One can only hope that this period has extended by a few days.After the short film describes a three-day scenario, this is probably the period for which the aggregates of the federal army can be expected.Unfortunately, the film does not mention how many of these units are available and how many facilities can be supplied. Support in protecting critical infrastructure Another dangerous scenario is also mentioned.Important frozen warehouses where cooling no longer works and dangerous substances can escape. Support of the fire brigade by the federal army should take place. But not only that. In addition to the failure of the entire food trade, gas stations and shops, the blackout of course also affects the security of banks. The federal army is to quickly support the police in protecting critical infrastructure with larger manpower. A thought that leaves a lot of room for speculation. Already in the first days of blackout, situations can therefore be expected that require special security and protection of various facilities. A short film that impressively describes three days of blackout. So after three days, the haunt is over. Europe-wide blackout at least one week! But what if the blackout takes longer? Herbert Saurugg explains in an interview that if the blackout is Europe-wide, it will take a good week for the power supply to start again.After this week, however, the supply of people with food cannot yet begin. Because without electricity, all telecommunications will also fail.According to Saurugg, it takes at least another week for the supply to start running again. So you have to take precautions yourself for at least two weeks. Self-sufficiency is the most important thing.You will be on your own. Important information for prevention and preparation for a blackout can be found here from AUF1 and on Herbert Saurugg's website under "Preparations for a blackout". Here is the short film of the Austrian Federal Army:
Og det bør tettes mellom A- Bølger og B- turbin. - Her kan man bruke Belg prinsippet. (trekkspill). Da er det kun luften og trykket som møter turbinbladene. - Ikke saltvann og den korridering å alger det medfører.
Quality Assurance Engineer.
20 års erfaring innen Teknisk Gummi og Polymer.
Denne løsningen virker som i hovedsak å behandle tidevannet som en (lavfrekvent) bølge, ikke som en strøm av skiftende styrke. Jeg utelukker ikke at det kan være en gyldig betrakningsvinkel (om enn med en viss skepsis).
Likevel: Å gå fra tidevann som strøm, til tidevann som bølge (med periode rundt tolv timer) til en luftstrøm, som driver en luft-turbin .... Jeg vil naturligvis ikke utelukke det som et mulig alternativ. Men ....
Det er vanskelig å forestille seg at det er mulig realisere en slik løsning til en kostnad som konkurrere med en "enkel" turbinløsning som direkte utnytter vannstrømmen i et lokalt sund til å produsere hundre kilowatt eller noe deromkring. Min magefølelse sier at denne luft-turbin-løsningen krever dramatisk større investeringer. Følgelig må den produsere dramatiske mengder energi, og er lite egnet for lokal småskala energiproduksjon i småsamfunn langs kysten.
Hvis man da anser det som noe mål ...
"Det skottske prosjektet" får det til å virke som at det var ett eneste. Det var diverse havkraft-prosjketer i Skottland.
Det andre er din avvising av "blader som skulle gi kraft på både tilslag og tilbakeslag". Det synes som en forutinntatt forestilling, trolig basert på en forståelse av hvordan en skipspropell fungerer i forhold til et skrog. En vannturbin som står fritt, uavhengig av noe skrog, er fullstendig symmetrisk med hensyn på vannstrømmen. Det er ingen grunn til å utforme bladene slik at de gir større effekt/virkningsgrad om vannet flyter den ene veien framfor den andre.
Jeg skal ikke utelukke at du selv i en 100% symmetrisk situasjon kan ha større gevinst av å optimalisere for flyt i den ene retningen enn det vil gi deg tap i den motsatte retingen - selv om det for meg som ikke-faglært synes underlig og overraskende. Hvis det er mulig å gi noen "folkelig", eller "intiuitiv" forklaring på noe slikt, er jeg Luthers øre!
Har du satt blåser i båt før på sjø?. Da vet du at når det er stille er det ikke stille. Alltid opp og ned på sjøen.
De hadde et prosjekt i skottland mao det er prøvd, men turbin blir montert for langt nede ved vannet som jeg skriver at det må skjermes mot saltet. - Min mening.
Her rapporten om hvorfor det ble avbrutt https://tethys.pnnl.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Islay_LIMPET_Report.pdf
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6K3v7-204X0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcStpg3i5V8
Quality Assurance Engineer.
20 års erfaring innen Teknisk Gummi og Polymer.
The performance of the counter rotating Wells turbine has been found to be lower than expected. This is due to the random oscillatory nature of the flow through the turbine when driven by waves. The random oscillating flow causes an earlier onset of stall in the turbine than when the flow is steady and unidirectional, with the occurrence of stall reducing the turbine efficiency. Such a dramatic difference between the unidirectional and oscillating flow performances of Wells turbines had not been previously observed. The lack of suitable oscillating flow facilities for testing the turbine meant that this effect could not have been predicted. In addition, the increased amount of turbine stall meant that a more substantial silencer was required. A noise attenuation chamber was retrofitted onto the end of the turbine ducting to solve this. Although no significant pressure drop occurs across this chamber, studies of the flow distribution around the annulus of the turbine ducting indicate that the chamber causes a mal-distribution of flow during the intake stroke of the turbine. The increased airflow at the bottom of the turbine ducting causes a further increase in stall with an associated reduction in turbine performance.
Quality Assurance Engineer.
20 års erfaring innen Teknisk Gummi og Polymer.
Fra Wikipedia ser jeg at en Wells-turbin er designet til å spinne i samme rotatasjonsretning uansett om luftstrømmen går den ene eller den andre veien. Artikkelen påpeker også problemet med steiling in denne typen turbiner. Steiling er vel et generelt problem, men når det spesielt er nevnt for Wells-turbiner, antar jeg at det er mer vesentlig der enn for andre turbin-typer.
Dette anlegget er et bølge-kraftverk, der retningen snur svært ofte (typisk i området rundt ti sekunder per syklus), men med betydelig skiftende periode. Det er ikke noe tidevanns-kraftverk med en syklus på rundt tolv timer, helt stabilt og uforanderlig. Det kan ha svært stor betydning for effektiviteten til, og evnentuelle problemer med, en gitt turbin-type.
Jeg observerer at det for en spesifikk type vindturbin viste seg å være større problemer med steiling enn forventet. Kanskje ikke enveis vindturbiner av Wells-type er den ideelle løsningen. Det er ingen solid grunn til å avvise hydroturbiner av helt andre typer, turbiner som er like effektive om vannet flyter den ene eller den andre veien, men snur rotasjonsretning med vannstrømmen, og som opererer i en vannstrøm med en syklustid på tolv timer eller derover.
(Men nå hsr vi vel reist langt fra temaet:)))
Her https://www.nrk.no/urix/frykter-kullmangel-vil-fore-til-at-millioner-vil-fryse-til-vinteren-1.15676613
blir vel Europeisk pris på strømmn i Norge også med slike problemer. Kanskje vi skal starte Store Norske Kullkompani og sende «Røde Robert» nordover igjen?
- Skal like å se når alle hyttene i skjærgården må rives for bølge- kraftverk i stedet
Quality Assurance Engineer.
20 års erfaring innen Teknisk Gummi og Polymer.
Dette er vanlig nede i Europa nå, på tysk, jeg har fått meg ny PC og der er der oversettningsprogram som er veldig grei å ha.
Skal begynne med prepping i dag, for nå skriver de der nede Economy
Because of the German energy transition: Blackout risk is increasing throughout Europe
Twice this year we already scratched past a blackout with a hair-sharp. Experts now consider a transnational power outage to be the most likely disaster - and the most dangerous. This is due, among other things, to the German energy transition.
Editorial office5 October 2021 19:49
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https://exxpress.at/media/2021/09/abb0680.jpgThe international electricity grid has become more unstable, experts say. APA/AFP/Robyn Beck
In Germany, the Federal Office of Civil Protection now considers a blackout to be the most likely disaster. Top analysts in the USA also warn: Europe is running out of electricity in winter. The reason: empty gas storage, lack of supplies from Russia and a strange calm wind. Germany's energy transition under Angela Merkel has exacerbated the situation even further.
Twice this year, the time had almost come. On the 8th January 2021 at 1.04 p.m., a sharp frequency drop occurred in the Austrian electricity grid as a result of a power plant failure in Romania. The Association of European Transmission System Operators proclaimed the third of four warning levels. Because if the fluctuations are too high, machines switch off from self-protection. If this also happens with power plants, the failure of a single power plant triggers a chain reaction - and it gets dark throughout Europe. But that didn't happen after all.
Interference in the power grid tenfold
Once again, a blackout almost occurred in early summer - but only almost. The disruptions in the European electricity grid have indeed increased tens of times, but they have not led to noticeable blackouts - so far. One reason for the unstable state of the electricity grid is Germany's energy transition: The continued shutdown of the power plants increases the risk of blackout.
https://exxpress.at/media/2021/09/abd0016.jpgCandles would have to replace the electric light in case of a blackoutAPA
Without electricity, everything collapses: the supply of food, the health system, telecommunications, transport infrastructure. All life in a modern civilization, whether public or private, depends on electrical energy. Without electricity - no light, no toilets, no heating, no telephone, no trains and trams, no supermarket checkout, no elevators. Water supply, television, mobile networks, Internet and traffic lights say goodbye, electric doors remain closed, lifts get stuck. After 24 hours, the traffic routes are clogged because more and more cars are running out of gas. After 48 hours, candles and gas stoves can cause large fires. Wastewater floods the roads, epidemics spread.
After 72 hours, the right of thumb applies
In several countries, the drinking water supply would collapse. However, in Austria, the drinking water supply for most people should still be ensured for a certain period of time. At least that's what the Austrian Association for the Gas and Water Industry (ÖVGW) says. The waterworks are equipped to be able to supply the daily need for drinking water for cooking and drinking and hygiene even in an emergency. Large parts of the country and thus a large part of the population get drinking water from the tap even in the event of a blackout, explains Wolfgang Nöstlinger, Vice-President of the ÖVGW.
https://exxpress.at/media/2021/09/windmills-ga1c10e9e1-1920.jpg2021 went particularly badly for alternative energies, partly because of the low wind
However, the supply of diesel fuel for the emergency generator sets would also be problematic. In any case, a nationwide supply of vital goods and services to citizens would no longer be possible after a few days. The state is unlikely to be able to ensure the safety of citizens after 72 hours at the latest. Public order would collapse and the only right of thumb applies anymore. Conditions such as in the early Middle Ages would be conceivable. The damage would also be enormous, far higher than in the event of a new pandemic or floods.
Green electricity reduces stability
In order to compensate for fluctuations and prevent a blackout, 43 companies from 36 countries have joined forces. This international system is intended to stabilize the power supply. But the rules of the game changed with renewable energies. Now electricity comes from many sources, from the solar system on the roof to the wind turbine in the field. Power plants are no longer being built where people consume a lot of electricity. Incidentally, an industrialized country like Germany cannot currently be maintained by alternative energy sources. In addition, the year 2021 was particularly bad for renewable energies. It could be the weakest year since 2003. Coal is therefore the most important energy source in Germany. What makes the supply even more difficult: It can only be achieved over long transport routes.
It is therefore feared that the European electricity grid will lose stability with the further expansion of green electricity, also because of the large number of energy sources. In addition, the network offers a larger attack surface due to increasing digitization and energy transition - see cyberatacke, as experienced by Ukraine in 2015 and 2016. Hackers had sneaked into the networks of three energy suppliers and hijacked the control electronics. Then they switched off the power supply for large parts of Kiev.
You can see: A blackout is not an unrealistic dystopia. For most experts, it is no longer the question of whether it occurs, but whenhttps://exxpress.at/blackout-gefahr-in-ganz-europa-steigt-wegen-deutsche-energiewende/?fbclid=IwAR2ckHZrSjq4LET7yv1zoiX62UvOzqhY9Kp377eVbv0HATAHkSVZr2ffeFM
Her sier de direkte at det er tyskernes overgang til sol vind og vedfyring (heter biomasse, trepellets) som har skylden.
Dettte er nok enda en smule mer nifst, mange ser nok på det som overdreven, men, når forsvarsdepartemenete og HÆREN i Østerrike begynner å skrive slik bør en kanskje vurdere å tro på det.
SIGNS OF EUROPE-WIDE COLLAPSE ARE CONDENSING
[right]Imago Images[/right]
The blackout warnings are increasing. New reports come almost every day. After the great warning from the Minister of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense is now also daring to get out of cover. The federal army on Facebook openly warns against a Europe-wide blackout. The signs that a complete Europe-wide collapse is imminent are condensing, as the blackout expert Herbert Saurugg explained in an interview.
In this short film, the haunt is already over after three days.Herbert Saurugg explained in an interview that you should also be prepared for a longer blackout of at least one week. Herbert Saurugg also has an excellent report on the side of the Austrian Federal Army, "Blackout - Nothing works anymore".Self-provision for a period of at least 14 days is enormously important.
Realistic danger
According to the Federal Army, a large-ranging power, infrastructure and supply failure is a realistic but underestimated danger. This short film describes a three-day scenario. Benefits of the Federal Army and care of a family in these three days, mentioning the self-sufficiency of durable food for 14 days. Preparations for such a scenario were started by the federal army in time. Among other things, this is about maintaining communication. This is a central point. The communication lines would also work without electricity.Through cooperation with the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of the Interior and other state authorities, Austria's leadership ability is guaranteed.
How long do the units last and how many are there?
The supply of water and fuel is immediately without electricity. The federal army is equipped with generator sets. It is worrying that more than 80 percent of the emergency generator sets were canceled within twelve hours during a federal army exercise in 2020. One can only hope that this period has extended by a few days.After the short film describes a three-day scenario, this is probably the period for which the aggregates of the federal army can be expected.Unfortunately, the film does not mention how many of these units are available and how many facilities can be supplied.
Support in protecting critical infrastructure
Another dangerous scenario is also mentioned.Important frozen warehouses where cooling no longer works and dangerous substances can escape. Support of the fire brigade by the federal army should take place. But not only that. In addition to the failure of the entire food trade, gas stations and shops, the blackout of course also affects the security of banks. The federal army is to quickly support the police in protecting critical infrastructure with larger manpower. A thought that leaves a lot of room for speculation. Already in the first days of blackout, situations can therefore be expected that require special security and protection of various facilities. A short film that impressively describes three days of blackout. So after three days, the haunt is over.
Europe-wide blackout at least one week!
But what if the blackout takes longer? Herbert Saurugg explains in an interview that if the blackout is Europe-wide, it will take a good week for the power supply to start again.After this week, however, the supply of people with food cannot yet begin. Because without electricity, all telecommunications will also fail.According to Saurugg, it takes at least another week for the supply to start running again. So you have to take precautions yourself for at least two weeks. Self-sufficiency is the most important thing.You will be on your own. Important information for prevention and preparation for a blackout can be found here from AUF1 and on Herbert Saurugg's website under "Preparations for a blackout".
Here is the short film of the Austrian Federal Army:
More on the subject:
https://www.wochenblick.at/bundesheer-warnt-vor-blackout/?fbclid=IwAR2FBXDZgnr40j1b7a3Qzq75zMR5vYiX2-5EgPSxeX1uwE0DIjQD1JBYkbw